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ABSTRACT: Over the last decade and a half there has emerged growing interest in 
the concept of ‚emotional intelligence‛ (henceforth EI), particularly within literature 
relating to occupational psychology, leadership, human resource management, and 
training.  This paper considers the rise of EI as a managerial discourse and seeks to 
make sense of it, first in relation to existing accounts of emotion at work, and 
subsequently through utilising the analytical possibilities presented by the work of 
Norbert Elias and Michel Foucault.  The case of EI is employed here as a concrete 
empirical site within which to explore potential complementarities between the 
analyses of Elias and Foucault, in particular around Elias’s arguments concerning 
the changing character of the social constraint towards self restraint, and Foucault’s dis-
cussion of power/knowledge and governmentality.  EI is found to enshrine a more 
general move towards greater emotional possibility and discretion both within the 
workplace and beyond — an ostensible emancipation of emotions from corporate 
attempts to script the management and display of employee feelings.  However, it is 
argued that rather than offering a simple liberation of our emotional selves, EI 
presents demands for a heightened emotional reflexivity concerning what is emotion-
ally appropriate at work and beyond.  As such, EI involves both greater emotional 
‚freedom‛ plus a proliferation of new modalities of emotional control, albeit based 
now on the expression of feelings as much as their repression.  Ultimately, these 
seemingly paradoxical aspects of EI serve to highlight an important point of inter-
section in the work of Elias and Foucault around their conceptualisations of power, 
selfhood, and the shifting character of social control. 
 
Keywords: Foucault, Elias, Emotion Management, Emotional Labour, Emotional 
Intelligence, Emotional Reflexivity. 
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Emotions at Work: The “Rules” are Changing 
Over the last two decades there has been something of a sea change in under-
standings of, and arguably prevailing orientations towards, emotion in the 
workplace.  Writing in 1993, Putnam and Mumby observed that: 
 
People regard emotion as a value-laden concept which is often treated as 
‘inappropriate’ for organizational life.  In particular, emotional reactions are 
often seen as ‘disruptive’, ‘illogical’, ‘biased’ and ‘weak’.  Emotion, then, becomes 
a deviation from what is seen to be sensible or intelligent< linked to the 
expressive arenas of life, not to the instrumental goal orientation that drives 
organizations.1  
 
Putnam and Mumby were here describing the prevailing business culture of the 
post-industrial West during the mid-1980s/early-1990s: a culture that, as they ob-
served it, was premised upon the understanding of a axiomatic, antithetical division 
between emotionality and rationality.  Emotions within the ethos they portray were 
characteristically regarded as a pollutant to clear-headed decision-making: some-
thing that needed to be ‚checked‛ on entry to the workplace, linked only to the 
expressive arenas of life: to leisure, to pleasure, to personal life.  Most importantly, 
emotions were seen to be a deviation from intelligence.  
 
At the time of their writing, Putnam and Mumby’s analysis arguably had a degree of 
accuracy as a depiction of many, but by no means all, sectors of the neo-liberalist 
workplace that had been successively fostered by the market-driven policies of 
Reaganomics in the United States, and Thatcherism within Great Britain.  The zeit-
geist of this era was perhaps most famously encapsulated in the words of Gordon 
Gecko, the character played by Michael Douglas in the 1987 film Wall Street: ‚Greed 
is good.‛  The phrase became something of a corporate mantra meaning, variously, 
‚Don’t be ashamed of your desire for wealth‛; ‚The market above everything else‛; 
‚Don’t let feelings get in the way, think only of profit and accumulation‛; ‚Don’t get 
emotional”’; or that other oft-cited justification, ‚This is not personal, it’s business.‛ 
 
Of course, to consider the workplace, indeed to consider any area of social life, any 
human exchange, as somehow entirely devoid of emotion is highly problematic. 
Greed, after all, is no less an emotional phenomenon than, say, philanthropy. 
Perhaps the most interesting aspect of ‚emotional intelligence‛ (henceforth EI2) as a 
set of ideas is that it takes as its starting point this very recognition of the emotional 
                                                 
1 L. L. Putnam and D. K. Mumby, ‚Organizations, emotion and the myth of rationality,‛ in S. 
Fineman (ed.), Emotion in Organizations, First Edition (London: Sage, 1993), 36. 
2 Throughout this paper I shall use the abbreviation ‚EI‛ to refer simultaneously to a set of ideas 
and to a set of practices informed by these ideas. 
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level in all human exchange, including that which is characteristic of the workplace. 
Even by name, EI challenges the perception that emotions are a deviation from 
intelligence.  For many of its advocates, EI embodies the understanding that the de-
gree and pattern of control exercised over emotions is something that is learned, 
developed, enhanced, and can be harnessed for (predominantly commercial) compe-
titive advantage.  The notion of EI seemingly dissolves the traditional opposition be-
tween emotionality and rationality, cognition and affect, thinking and feeling.  It 
stylistically renders all business as profoundly personal.  It potentially offers an 
emancipation of the emotions within the workplace and beyond — a corrective to 
the myth of the rational organisation, and to traditional models of intelligence which 
stress only cognitive functioning and abstract reasoning ability.  
 
As a managerial discourse, the rise of emotional intelligence over the past decade and 
a half has been exceptional.  Outside of academic circles, the concept was largely 
unknown before the publication of Daniel Goleman’s enormously successful Emotional 
Intelligence: Why it Can Matter More than IQ, first published in 1995. Subsequently, 
there has been something of an explosion of interest in the topic.  The Internet retailer 
Amazon now lists thousands of books devoted to EI.  Titles range from the develop-
mental — Building Healthy Minds (2000); to the more applied — Linking Emotional 
Intelligence and Performance at Work (2005), Emotional Capitalists: The New Leaders (2008); 
and the perhaps inevitable — Emotional Intelligence 2.0 (2009). Accompanying this pro-
liferation of literature has been an exponential growth in the EI consultancy industry.  
EI consultants offer organisations ‚employee feeling inventories;‛3 ‚EQ Coaching;‛4 
and other manifold opportunities to ‚<engage the power of emotional intelligence to 
create positive change — everywhere.‛5  A range of existing measures of aptitude, 
personality traits, and psychological ability have been extended or repackaged to 
incorporate some of the key principles of EI — as a no-table example, the key practi-
tioner journal Competence has renamed itself Competence and Emotional Intelligence.  
 
Such titles would appear to suggest that the sort of attitudes towards emotions 
described by Putnam and Mumby in the early 1990s have all but disappeared. 
Indeed, the spread of the ideas and practices involved with EI is by no means confined 
to the academic and practitioner literatures.  They are increasingly being utilised in lay 
analyses of almost all arenas of social life.  At the time of this writing, in Great Britain, 
                                                 
3 Simmons Management Systems, ‚Hire and develop top employees,‛ 2009, accessed December 
2009 at http://www.eqhelp.com.  
4 S. Dunn, ‚Personal life coaching, executive coaching with Susan Dunn,‛ 2009, accessed 
December 2009 at http://www.susandunn.cc/.  
5 J. Wright, ‚Jenni Wright: emotional intelligence consultant speaker and coach,‛ 2009, accessed 
December 2009 at http://www.emotionalintelligenceaus.com/. 
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the concept is being drawn upon in analyses of soccer managers and players;6 the 
Machiavellian strategies of different contestants on the television show The Apprentice;7 
and the contrast in leadership styles of the Conservative leader David Cameron and 
the current Prime Minster Gordon Brown.8  Within the workplace, demands for emo-
tionally intelligent employees are on the rise.  In the recruitment pages today are the 
details of a job vacancy for a ‚Director of training and development‛ at a London-
based consultancy firm.  The Director will need to have ‚High levels of emotional 
intelligence‛ such that she or he can ‚<rapidly build rapport and trust with clients 
and colleagues alike.‛9 Similarly, EI is listed as an essential skill for an administrator, 
so that the successful candidate must be able to ‚communicate sensitively and 
effectively.‛10 And a ‚Trainee Headhunter‛ is required to have high levels of EI so that 
he or she can ‚read situations‛ and ‚connect with the needs of different clients.‛11 A 
recent large-scale recruitment survey under-taken by GRADdirect of the Reed group 
(Reed Consulting 2008) found that 42% of British employers surveyed ranked EI 
characteristics as among the most important for new recruits, as compared to only 
27% prioritising a candidate’s academic abilities.12  It would seem, as Goleman has 
claimed, that ‚The rules for work are changing‛ — the chief criterion for employee 
recruitment, promotion, retention, is no longer simply ‚how smart we are,‛ but ‚how 
well we handle ourselves and each other.‛13  
 
To the degree that writers like Goleman and others who have popularised the 
concept of EI have influenced ground-level changes in employee recruitment and 
assessment practices, the EI consultancy movement is indeed involved in more than 
simply documenting important shifts in ‚the rules of work.‛  However, as I have 
argued elsewhere, such shifts relate to considerably more than the rise of EI as a dis-
cursive invention.14  As such, EI is best understood not so much as a set of ideas that, 
through their application, are in themselves engendering a social transformation, but 
                                                 
6 The Guardian, October 8, 2009: accessed online December 2009 at http://www.guardian.co.uk/ 
football/blog/2009/oct/08/sir-alex-ferguson-alan-wiley. 
7 The Guardian, April 29, 2009, accessed online December 2009 at http://www.guardian.co.uk/ 
media/organgrinder/2009/apr/29/apprentice-reality-tv. 
8 The Guardian, October  8, 2009, accessed online December 2009 at http://www.guardian.co.uk/ 
commentisfree/2009/oct/08/jonathan-freedland-david-cameron-speech. 
9 ‚Reed.co.uk — jobs, careers, employment and recruitment‛, 2009, accessed December 2009 at 
http://www.reed.co.uk/. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Ibid.  
12 See Reed Consulting, ‚GRADdirect study reveals that graduate recruiters want soft skills above 
academic qualifications,‛ 2008, accessed December 2009 at http://www.reedpressoffice.co.uk.  
13 D. Goleman, Working With Emotional Intelligence (London: Bloomsbury, 1998), 3. 
14 J. Hughes, ‚Bringing emotion to work: emotional intelligence, employee resistance, and the 
reinvention of character,‛ Work Employment and Society, 19 (3) (2005). 
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rather as an exemplar of more general changes in how emotions are understood, 
articulated, and deployed within the institutional networks that comprise ‚the work-
place‛, and, indeed, beyond such relational nexuses.  Following the analytic approa-
ches of both Elias and Foucault (in which, as we shall see, there is a degree of 
common ground), EI will be considered here as a sociogenetic field of discursive affor-
dances, conditions, and possibilities — a discourse enshrining ways of seeing, saying, 
and doing that in and of itself constitutes a legitimate empirical object for investi-
gation and analysis.  Accordingly, the first objective of this paper is to explore how 
‚we‛ might make sense of the rise of EI, as at once a new managerial discourse and, 
to continue the analysis presented above, a signal of changing orientations towards 
the management and display of emotions at work.  The implied ‚we‛ in this ques-
tion also provides the basis for the paper’s second and principal objective.  
Following the theme of this Special Issue of Foucault Studies, the ‚we‛ implies scho-
lars who are interested in the work of Norbert Elias and Michel Foucault, and in 
particular, the potential for a dialogue between the work of these two authors.  Thus, 
the discourse of EI is here used as both a substantive topic for investigation in its 
own right, and as an empirical vehicle for an analysis of complementary themes in 
the work of Elias and Foucault.  While it is beyond the scope of this paper to present 
a comprehensive analysis of points of overlap and contrast in these authors’ work, it 
is against the backdrop of what might be called the Foucault–Elias debate that its 
key arguments are developed.15  To date, comparative analyses of the work of Fou-
cault and Elias have characteristically been undertaken by means of textual exegesis 
and formal conceptual reconstruction.  In contrast, this paper seeks to offer a contri-
bution to the field by providing an empirically applied comparison of the two 
authors, considering competing understandings of, and orientations towards, emo-
tional control in institutional settings. 
 
                                                 
15 For a full account of this debate see, inter alii, R. van Krieken, ‚The organisation of the soul: 
Elias and Foucault on discipline and the self,‛ Archives Europeénes de Sociologie, 31(2) (1990); R. 
van Krieken, Norbert Elias. Key Sociologist Series (London: Routledge, 1998); I. Burkitt, ‚Over-
coming metaphysics: Elias and Foucault on power and freedom,‛ Philosophy of the Social Sciences, 
23 (1) (1993); D. Smith, ‚’The Civilizing Process’ and ‘The History of Sexuality’: comparing Elias 
and Foucault,‛ Theory and Society, 28 (1999); G. Sewell & J. Barker, ‚Neither good, nor bad, but 
dangerous: surveillance as an ethical paradox,‛ Ethics and Information Technology, 3 (3) (2001); D. 
Smith & T. Newton,  ‚Introduction,‛ in A. van Iterson, W. Mastenbroek; T. Newton & D. Smith 
(eds.), The Civilized Organization: Norbert Elias and the Future of Organization Studies. (Amsterdam/ 
Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing Company, 2002); P. Spierenburg, ‚Punishment, power, 
and history: Foucault and Elias,‛ Social Science History, 28 (4) (2004); R. Kilminster, The Sociological 
Revolution: From Enlightenment to the Global Age (London: Routledge, 1998); R. Kilminster, Post-
Philosophical Sociology (London: Routledge, 2007); E. Dunning and J. Hughes, Norbert Elias, 
Sociology, and the Human Crisis: Interdependence, Power, and Process (Cambridge: Polity, 2010); plus 
other papers in this Special Section. 
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To clarify the central line of argument developed in this paper as a whole it is first 
worth quoting one of the most frequently cited (and misconstrued) of Foucault’s 
statements from an interview entitled ‚On the genealogy of ethics‛: ‚My point is not 
that everything is bad, but that everything is dangerous, which is not exactly the 
same as bad.  If everything is dangerous, then we always have something to do.‛16 
Foucault’s proposal here is arguably more polemical than ontological, it invokes a 
disposition that leads ‚<not to apathy, but to a hyper- and pessimistic activism.‛17 
But it is also a statement about power/knowledge, one that has particular utility as a 
starting point for considering EI.  When viewed through the lens of dominant socio-
logical accounts of emotion at work, notably Arlie Hochschild’s concept of ‚emo-
tional labour,‛ the ascendancy of the ideas and practices related to EI does indeed 
appear to be ‚bad.‛  In short, the discourse of EI seems to mark a continuation and 
intensification of well-documented processes that are said to involve the increasing 
corporate ‚colonisation‛ of employee affects and subjectivities.18  However, the case 
of EI also demonstrates some of the limitations of such accounts of the control 
strategies pursued in the contemporary workplace.  In particular, EI serves to high-
light that management cannot simply script the emotions of employees, cannot 
simply manufacture a desired subjectivity — employees inevitably resist such at-
tempts, and, moreover, the model of power that is implied in such notions itself 
needs to be revisited.19  Indeed, as a consultancy discourse, EI centrally involves the 
notion that the kinds of control practices involved in the corporate scripting of 
emotions, the commercial engineering of feeling, are profoundly unintelligent.  A 
key theme of the EI practitioner movement is that, within the workplace, employees 
should be afforded considerable personal and professional discretion concerning how 
they display, manage, and monitor their feelings.  In this way, then, the discourse of 
                                                 
16 M. Foucault, ‚On the genealogy of ethics,‛ in H. L. Dreyfus and P. Rabinow (eds.), Michel 
Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics, 2nd ed. (Chicago: The University of Chicago 
Press, 1983), 231-232. 
17 Ibid., 232. 
18 A. R. Hochschild, The Managed Heart: Commercialization of Human Feeling (California: University 
of California Press, 1983); G. Kunda, Engineering Culture (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 
1992); S. Fineman, ‚Organisations as emotional arenas‛ in S. Fineman (ed.), Emotion in 
Organizations, First Edition (London: Sage, 1993); Putnam & Mumby; C. Casey, Work, Self and 
Society: After Industrialism (London: Sage, 1995); C. Grey, ‚Towards a critique of managerialism: 
the contribution of Simone Weil,‛ Journal of Management Studies, 33 (5) (1996): 592–611; T. 
Strangleman, & I. Roberts, ‚Looking through the window of opportunity: the cultural cleansing 
of workplace identity,‛ Sociology, 29 (4) (1999); F. Wilson, ‚Cultural control within the virtual 
organization,‛ Sociological Review, 47 (4) (1999); I. Grugulis, T. Dundon & A. Wilkinson, ‚Cultural 
control and the ‘culture manager’: employment practices in a consultancy,‛ Work Employment and 
Society, 14 (1) (2000); P. Fleming & A. Spicer, ‚Working at a cynical distance: implications for 
power, subjectivity and resistance,‛ Organization, 10 (1) (2003). 
19 See Hughes for a full discussion of these concerns. 
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EI ostensibly offers the conditions for a liberation of emotional expression.  Hence, it 
shall be argued that EI is not simply ‚bad‛: however, it remains, nonetheless, to be 
‚dangerous‛ to the extent that in place of scripting it promotes the development of a 
heightened emotional reflexivity concerning what is emotionally appropriate at work 
and beyond.  Put simply, EI involves a discursive shift towards implicit, unstated, 
and motile standards of what is emotionally ‚fitting,‛ ‚apposite,‛ ‚appropriate,‛ or 
‚intelligent.‛  And these shifting and flexible standards of behaviour are in many 
ways more demanding, more difficult to negotiate than scripts or clearly delineated 
formal rules regarding what is permitted and ‚correct‛ and what is not.  Thus, 
rather than offering a simple and unequivocal ‚free play‛ of emotions at work, EI 
presents the discursive conditions for a proliferation of new modalities of emotional 
control, albeit based now on the expression of feelings as much as their repression. 
As such, it is argued, EI serves empirically to demonstrate a key point of intersection 
between the respective theses developed by Elias and Foucault regarding long-term 
changes in the character of social/self control: where freedom and constraint are 
conceived not so much as opposites, but as two sides of the same coin. 
 
In pursuing these arguments, the discussion below commences with an exposition of 
the EI concept.  Following this, the discourse of EI discourse is analysed in relation 
to the para-Marxian concept of emotional labour, which, as suggested above, has 
come to dominate existing sociological accounts of emotion at work.  This initial 
review is intended to form an empirical basis for the more general exploration of 
analytical complementarities in the work of Elias and Foucault that is advanced by 
the paper.  A conceptual dialogue is then generated between an Eliasian analytic — 
in which the rise of EI is considered as part of processes of ‚civilisation‛ and ‚infor-
malisation‛ — and a Foucauldian reading of EI as marking shifting modalities of 
power: from ‚control via repression‛ to ‚control via stimulation.‛  Finally, the con-
sideration of complementarities in Elias’s and Foucault’s analytical frames is 
followed by an exploration of important incompatibilities, tensions, and contrasts 
between these authors’ work, particularly in terms of their respective relationships 
to the enterprises of science and philosophy. 
 
Emotional Intelligence 
Within the academic literature, the concept of EI has its origins in the rapidly 
changing field of neuroscience as expressed in the writings of such authors as Joseph 
LeDoux and Antonio Damasio.20  But it is writers from the discipline of applied 
                                                 
20 J. LeDoux, ‚Sensory systems and emotion,‛ Integrative Psychiatry, 4 (1986); J. LeDoux, “Emotion 
and the Limbic System Concept,‛ Concepts in Neuroscience, 2 (1992); A. Damasio, The Feeling of 
What Happens: Body, Emotion and the Making of Consciousness (London: Vintage, 2000); A. Damasio, 
Looking for Spinoza (London: Vintage, 2004); A. Damasio, Descartes’ Error: Emotion, Reason and the 
Human Brain (London: Vintage, 2006). 
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psychology who have paid most attention to EI, particularly in assessing the 
concept’s validity.21  To date, there is no coherent theoretical centre to the concept of 
EI.  There remains considerable debate over the very ‚competencies‛ that could be 
said to constitute emotional intelligence;22 and indeed, over the possibility and prac-
tice of measuring these.23  More recent research has explored the concept through its 
application at the organisation level, particularly in relation to themes such as 
leadership and group emotional state or organisational climate.24  However, while 
the term is widely recognised to have been coined by Salovey and Mayer, it is the 
journalist and author Daniel Goleman who has played a central role in popularising 
the ideas involved, and in bringing them to a practitioner audience. 25 
 
For present purposes, the focus here is upon the model of EI developed by Gole-
man.26 The principal reasons for this selection are as follows:  1) As suggested above, 
Goleman is by far the leading advocate of EI, having written what are deemed to be 
the paradigmatic texts within the field, and having also established himself as the 
leading authority on the topic in the popular mind, though his status as an authority 
is more disputed in academic circles.27  2) Goleman, more than any other figure, has 
                                                 
21 See, for example, R. J. Sternberg & J. C. Kaufman, ‚Human abilities,‛ Annual Review of 
Psychology, 49 (1998); M. Davies, L. Stankov & R. Roberts, ‚Emotional intelligence: in search of an 
illusive construct,‛ Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 75 (1998); N. S. Schutte, J. M. 
Malouff, L. E. Hall, D. J. Haggerty, J. T. Cooper, C. J. Golden & L. Dornheim, ‚Development and 
validation of a measure of emotional intelligence,‛ Personality and Individual Differences, 25 (1998); 
R. Abraham, ‚Emotional intelligence in organisations: a conceptualization,‛ Genetic Social and 
General Psychology Monographs, 125 (2) (1999); Q. Huy, ‚Emotional capability, emotional 
intelligence, and radical change‛ Academy of Management Review, 24 (2) (1999). 
22 M. Davies, L. Stankov & R. Roberts; J. Mayer, D. Caruso & P. Salovey, ‛Emotional intelligence 
meets traditional standards for an intelligence,‛ Intelligence, 27 (1999); J. Ciarrochi, J. Forgas & J. 
Mayer (eds.), Emotional Intelligence in Everyday Life: A Scientific Enquiry (Philadelphia: Psychology 
Press, 2000); N. Ashkanasy, W. Zerbe & C. Härtel (eds.), Managing Emotions in the Workplace 
(London: M. E. Sharpe, 2002). 
23 M. Davies, L. Stankov & R. Roberts; N. Ashkanasy, W. Zerbe & C. Härtel. 
24 N. Ashkanasy, C. Härtel & W. Zerbe (eds.), The Effect of Affect in Organizational Settings 
(London: Emerald Group Publishing Limited, 2005); N. Ashkanasy & C. Cooper, Research 
Companion to Emotion in Organizations (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2008). 
25 P. Salovey & J. D. Mayer, ‚Emotional intelligence,‛ Imagination, Cognition and Personality, 9 
(1990); D. Goleman, Emotional Intelligence: why it can matter more than IQ (London: Bloomsbury, 
1996); D. Goleman, Working With Emotional Intelligence; D. Goleman, R. Boyatzis & A. McKee, The 
New Leaders: Transforming the Art of Leadership (New York: Sphere, 2003); D. Goleman, Social 
Intelligence: The New Science of Human Relationships (London: Arrow Books, 2007). 
26 In his more recent publications, Goleman also refers to ‚social intelligence,‛ but the core of his 
work has remained remarkably consistent over time. 
27 See, for example, the key points of contention discussed by S. Hein, ‚Critical review of Daniel 
Goleman,‛ (2009), accessed December 2009 at http://eqi.org/gole.htm.  
Foucault Studies, No. 8, pp. 28-52 
36 
 
developed a model of EI that establishes it firmly as a managerial discourse.  This is 
particularly the case for his 1998 text, Working With Emotional Intelligence; here 
Goleman adopts the style and format of a long tradition of popular management 
literature, making explicit prescriptions for how EI should be translated into institu-
tional practices.  3) Goleman is the most widely cited author on the topic, parti-
cularly in practitioner journals in the fields of HRM, executive coaching, leadership, 
general management, and training and development.  Indeed, he has been identified 
using LexisNexis citation indices as one of the top ten most influential ‚management 
gurus‛ alive today.28  It is precisely because his work constitutes the version of 
emotional intelligence that is most likely to be drawn upon by workplace consul-
tants and management practitioners that it receives central attention in this paper.  
 
Along with authors such as Bar-On, Cooper, Sawaf, and Boyatzis, Goleman belongs, 
loosely speaking, to a school of writers who champion EI in terms of the results it 
can bring, particularly in the workplace.29  For Goleman, such results can best be 
understood when contrasted with more conventional understandings of intelligence, 
in particular the ‚IQ‛ model.  This is evident from the very title of his text, Emotional 
Intelligence: why it can matter more than IQ.  Here Goleman proposes that IQ might, at 
best, contribute: ‚<about 20 percent to the factors that determine life success, which 
leaves 80 percent to other forces.‛30  It is within this other eighty percent of factors 
that Goleman locates EI. 
 
For Goleman, EI can essentially be defined as ‚how well you handle yourself.‛  It 
refers to the extent of our emotional literacy, our ability to recognise our own 
emotions and those of others.  It relates to a person’s capacity both to manage their 
emotions and to draw upon these as a resource.  As Aristotle writes: ‚Anyone can 
become angry — that is easy.  But to be angry with the right person, to the right de-
gree, at the right time, for the right purpose, and in the right way — that is not easy.‛31  
Goleman argues that it is precisely these kinds of capacities that are not detected by 
conventional models of intelligence, and yet, he proposes, they matter fundamentally 
                                                 
28 Accenture, ‚Accenture study yields top 50 ‘business intellectuals,‛ (2003), accessed December 
2009 at http://www.accenture.com, 4. 
29 R. Bar-On, Bar-On Emotional Quotient Inventory: A Measure of Emotional Intelligence (Toronto: 
Multi-Health Systems, 1997); R. Cooper & A. Sawaf, Executive EQ: Emotional Intelligence in 
Business (London: Orion Business, 1997); A. McKee, R. Boyatzis & F. Johnston, Becoming a 
Resonant Leader: Develop Your Emotional Intelligence, Renew Your Relationships, Sustain Your 
Effectiveness (Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 2008); N. Ashkanasy, W. Zerbe & C. Härtel 
(eds.), Managing Emotions in the Workplace, 13. 
30 Goleman, Emotional Intelligence: why it can matter more than IQ, 34. 
31 Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics referenced in Goleman, Emotional Intelligence: why it can matter 
more than IQ, ix. 
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for success in commercial life and beyond.  Unlike IQ, which is seen to be fixed and 
immutable from birth, Goleman’s interpretation of EI as a set of social skills means 
that, crucially, it involves capacities that can be developed.  In this connection, Gole-
man proposes a five-part domain model to explain ‚how we can bring intelligence to 
our emotions.‛32 The model is made up of three intra-personal ‚competencies‛ — 
knowing one’s emotions, managing emotions, motivating one-self; and two interpersonal 
competencies — recognising emotions in others and handling relationships. 
 
Goleman illustrates his conception of well-developed emotional competencies by 
drawing upon psychologist Jack Block’s descriptions of the ‚IQ pure type‛ and the 
‚EI pure type.‛33  These ideal types are further divided according to gender, such 
that we are presented with a four section classificatory model consisting of the IQ 
pure type, male; the EI pure type, male; the IQ pure type, female; and the EI pure type, 
female.  The male IQ pure type is a caricature of the academic.  He excels in thought 
and endeavours of the mind, but is impoverished in understanding feelings and his 
personal life.  He has a wide range of intellectual interests and abilities.  He is pro-
ductive and ambitious, but is often ‚<critical and condescending, fastidious and 
inhibited, uneasy with sexuality and sensual experience, unexpressive and detached, 
and emotionally bland and cold.‛34 The male EI pure type, by contrast, is usually 
cheerful.  He is not prone to worry.  He is ethical, sympathetic, and caring.  His 
emotional life is rich, but ‚appropriate‛: he is comfortable with himself.  
 
The female IQ pure type is articulate, confident and intellectual.  She has a wide 
range of interests, but is introspective; she is hesitant to express her anger openly 
(though she often does so indirectly).  By contrast, the female EI pure type is 
assertive, good at expressing feelings directly, positive, outgoing and gregarious. 
She does not express feelings through outbursts.  She is open to new experiences. 
High EI women also enjoy a qualitatively different emotional life from those of their 
IQ counterparts: ‚*Unlike+ women purely high in IQ, they rarely feel anxious or 
guilty, or sink into rumination.‛35  Goleman notes that these ideal types should be 
taken very much as constructions to serve didactic purposes.  He is not, of course, 
suggesting that there are simply four types of people.  Instead he argues that all of 
us are mixes of IQ and EI.  However, according to Goleman, ‚<emotional intelli-
gence adds far more of the qualities that make us more fully human.‛36  
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From this somewhat truncated exposition of EI, it is already apparent that Goleman is 
classifying as ‚intelligent‛ the more open, rounded and stable management and 
presentation of emotions.  However, his prescriptions go beyond mere ‚display rules.‛  
He encourages us to manage what we feel more than simply what we feign such that 
through developing our EI we learn actually to become more empathetic, sympathetic, 
positive, gregarious, etc. since these are the traits of ‚winners and stars.‛37  Here one can 
also observe the significance of emotional authenticity to the discourse of EI.  Goleman 
understands the feigning of emotions as, under many circumstances, emotionally 
unintelligent.  He advocates that we should learn to be emotionally direct, open and 
honest, at the right times.  This honesty in human exchanges is, he suggests, in turn 
premised upon the ideal of ‚self-awareness‛ — greater understanding of our own 
emotions; learning to recognise our ‚true‛ feelings; learning to classify and monitor 
these; and so forth.  In this sense, the discourse of EI evidently constitutes more than a 
set of emotional scripts to be per-formed irrespective of our ‚true‛ feelings.  However, 
despite its rhetorical emphasis on emotional liberation and authenticity, the discourse of 
EI — particularly in relation to its emphasis on harnessing emotions for personal and 
professional success — equally appears to mark a continuation of processes that have 
involved an increasing ‚commercialisation of feeling.‛  The term ‚emotional labour‛38 
has come to gain considerable intellectual currency as a referent to such processes, and 
more specifically as a conceptualisation of increasingly sophisticated managerialist at-
tempts to engineer corporate emotional landscapes through the exploitation of 
employees’ emotion management in the service of commercial ends.  It is worth briefly 
examining the concept of emotional labour, and in particular, the extent to which EI can 
be understood to constitute a continuation of, or a break from, the processes invoked by 
this term since, ultimately, this model of conceiving ‚emotions at work‛ (in both senses 
of the phrase) serves as a point of departure for the subsequent discussion of the EI 
discourse in relation to Eliasian and Foucauldian analytics. 
  
Emotional Intelligence as Emotional Labour? 
Over the past few decades, organisational research into emotional labour has come 
to figure centrally in sociological accounts of emotion at work.  The principal pro-
genitor of this research is Arlie Hochschild, particularly in her 1983 study The 
Managed Heart.  Hochschild defines emotional labour, as opposed to ‚emotion work‛ 
(‚private‛ emotion management), as the management of feeling undertaken in 
exchange for wages.  In emotional labour, Hochschild argues, our private ways of 
using emotion are ‚transmuted‛ to serve commercial ends.  Our smiles, moods, 
feelings and relationships become products that belong more to the employer and 
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less to the self.39  In relation to an empirical study of flight attendants, Hochschild 
observed the management of outward emotional display, and inner-directed emo-
tional labour, to maintain among passengers: ‚<the sense of being cared for in a 
convivial and safe place.‛40  In this way, Hochschild states, ‚<the emotional style of 
offering the service is part of the service itself.‛41  From their training and through 
feedback from supervisors, Hochschild’s flight attendants learned to comply with 
corporate ‚feeling rules.‛  On one level — the level of surface acting — these rules are 
scripts to direct the expression of feeling.  However, on another level — that of deep 
acting — the rules are much more pervasive: they relate to how workers are obliged/ 
constrained actually to feel and to experience their feelings.  In this way, flight 
attendants were compelled not just to appear to love their job, but to actually try to 
love it, to learn to enjoy their exchanges with customers, empathise with unruly 
passengers, and so forth. 
 
Given this brief overview, it would appear, at least in terms of a preliminary 
analysis, that EI has all the hallmarks of constituting demands for emotional labour. 
EI involves as a central principle the idea that emotions can be utilised for compe-
titive commercial advantage, they can, to refer to Hochschild’s definition, have an 
exchange value.  As we have seen, however, an individual seen to be high in EI, does 
not simply manipulate the outward expression of emotion, it is not just a question of 
surface acting.  EI also involves intrapersonal ‚mastery‛ — in Hochschild’s language, 
deep acting — particularly in relation to the idea that we should actually come to 
experience ourselves as more sympathetic, caring, empathetic, etc. through deve-
loping our emotional competencies.  Moreover, in EI, the commercialisation of fee-
ling is effectively taken one stage further by stylistically collapsing the distinction 
between emotionality and rationality.  In the neologistic packaging of EI, emotion, 
even unchecked feeling, is presented not as an environmental concern, as an 
opposing consideration to the instrumental goals of an organisation, but as crucial to 
commercial and personal success.  This means that, even purely in terms of a profit 
motive — and not from an appeal to moral, ethical, or philanthropic concerns — it 
makes good business sense to take notice of the emotions operating in a workplace. 
Even if greed is good, advocates of EI suggest that we must recognise the commercial 
importance of emotions in helping us to satiate greed.  In this way, ‚emotion‛ itself 
is discursively ‚transmuted‛ into a corporate resource that can be allocated and 
enhanced. 
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To return once again to Foucault’s earlier cited ‚not bad, but dangerous‛ statement, 
the ‚bad‛ of emotional labour is that, for Hochschild, it further increases the span of 
managerial control, facilitating an increasing pervasion into the ‚inner reaches‛ of 
emotional subjectivity.  On the face of it, EI extends this capacity further still.  After 
all, EI is understood to be a measure not simply of our performance at work, but of 
who we are.  The scope, then, for employees to develop protective self-distancing stra-
tegies, to maintain a clear distinction between their selves at work and their ‚true‛ 
selves beyond is severely curtailed.42  The rhetorical appeal of EI — that it is based 
upon neuroscience, not an arbitrary managerial standard — might indeed com-
pound the tendency, under the rubric of EI, for dissent or a breakdown in emotional 
performance to be pathologised as an individual failing, as indicative of a person 
who lacks requisite levels of emotional competence, as something that is wrong with 
me.43  Yet advocates of EI encourage the capacity to maintain a ‚healthy‛ distance 
between the personal and professional ‚self.‛  Goleman, for example, states quite 
explicitly, that ‚<a blurring of the distinction between work and private life< itself 
signifies poor emotional competence.‛44  
 
In this respect, then, Hochschild and Goleman appear to share common concerns. 
Each is advocating a separation between ‚private‛ and ‚public‛ life so as to protect 
the ‚true‛ emotional self.  For Hochschild, ‚navigation of the emotional waters‛45 in 
our private lives serves the purposes of welfare and pleasure, whereas in the public 
domain ‚a profit motive slips in.‛46   Our ‚private‛ uses of feeling are thus deemed 
to require protection from the interests of capitalist enterprises.  Similarly, Gole-
man’s emphasis is upon elucidating our true feelings.  Indeed, he identifies the com-
petence of emotional self-awareness as central to EI.  However, his intention, he 
states, is definitely not: ‚<to argue for making organizations places where people 
simply bare their feelings or souls to each other, in some nightmarish vision of the 
office as a kind of emotional salon or ongoing sensitivity group<.‛47 
 
But while both Goleman and Hochschild warn against the blurring of the boun-
daries between private and working lives, this very conception of an absolute split 
between the ‚private‛ and ‚public,‛ ‚authentic‛ and ‚acted,‛ ‚real‛ and ‚false‛ 
                                                 
42 J. Cullinane & M. Pye, ‚Winning and losing in the workplace — the use of emotions in the 
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selves, is itself problematic, as is the more general conceptualisation of power and 
selfhood that is common to Hochschild and other dominant sociological accounts of 
emotions at work.  It is in this connection in particular that, in different ways, the 
work of both Elias and Foucault each offers considerable utility in rethinking the 
expansion of emotional labour and, more particularly, the rise of EI as a managerial 
discourse.  Indeed, the notional stratified ‚self‛ which both Hochschild and Gole-
man consider axiomatic for their respective analyses, marks for both Elias and Fou-
cault at once a point of departure, and through a shared focus on the sociogenesis of 
‚modern‛ selfhood, a concrete analytical focus.  It is in their departure from conven-
tional accounts of ‚the self,‛ plus their more general rejection of the model of power 
that is contained in such notions as emotional labour, that we can observe some 
considerable complementarities in the work of both Elias and Foucault.  Thus, in 
what follows, we reconsider emotional labour, EI, and ‚emotions at work‛ through 
Eliasian and Foucauldian analytical lenses, both as a means to reconceptualise the 
key issues discussed thus far, and to explore key intersections, and ultimately 
incompatibilities, between Elias’s and Foucault’s work. 
 
Informalisation, Civilisation, and Emotional Reflexivity 
As Wouters has argued, a key problem with Hochschild’s account of emotional 
labour is in her positing of a real, pre-social emotional self residing exclusively in the 
private sphere that, through the process of transmutation, becomes appropriated by 
such commercial enterprises.48  Hochschild’s analytical division between private and 
public, real and false, authenticity and acting can be understood as expressive of a 
socially-instilled reification based upon an image of human beings that Norbert Elias 
has called Homo clausus: ‚a human self-image according to which the true self of a 
person is hidden deep inside — one cannot be quite sure inside of what.‛49  Homo 
clausus loosely means ‚closed personalities,‛ it refers to a dominant present-day 
experience of a dividing line between ‚the real me in here‛ and ‚society out there.‛50 
There is not room here for a full-blown exposition of Elias’s ideas in this connection, 
nonetheless one of the central undertakings in his work on civilising processes was 
to elucidate how Homo clausus self-experiences, indeed, how ‚private‛ emotional 
subjectivities, are historically as well as biographically constituted.  Elias traces long-
term shifts in the structure and character of the emotional lives of specific groups of 
people, notably members of the secular upper classes, with a focus in particular on 
transitions from the late Middle Ages to the Early Modern period.  From this ana-
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lysis, he elucidates a shift involving an advancing threshold of shame and repugnance in 
relation to bodily functions, both of the self and of others, and an increasing social 
restraint towards self-restraint.  If we were to contrast, say, the table manners of people 
eating together in the manner customary of the Middle Ages, we might observe 
behaviours that to present day sensibilities would be regarded as distasteful, vulgar, 
perhaps embarrassing — eating from a common dish, with unwashed hands, bel-
ching and farting at the table, etc.  In this previous era, people’s emotions were 
conditioned in a different way.  What had not yet been developed to the extent that 
it is now — and what may be at play in our reactions to their behaviours — is an 
‚invisible wall of affects‛ that seemingly rises at the approach of something that has 
entered the mouth of another person, at the sight or even mention of certain bodily 
functions, or as a feeling of shame or embarrassment when our own functions are 
exposed to others.51  
 
This ‚invisible wall‛ that seems to interject itself between one body and another, 
repelling and separating, is central to the self-experience of Homo clausus.  Put simp-
ly, the conception of a split between the private and public domains of life is itself 
something that develops over time (both biographically and historically).  Thus, gro-
wing demands for emotion management cannot simply be reduced to the actions of 
capitalist enterprises; these are rooted in much broader and longer-term processes of 
social change. Even from the few examples provided above — and Elias provides 
many more — we can also observe how seemingly private, individual, and personal 
experiences of ourselves, plus our feelings and approaches toward others, are part of 
our historically emergent social habitus.  One can also observe how the search for 
authenticity may in turn be related to the connected experience of a deeply hidden 
true, essential me and the longing to uncover it. 
 
While Hochschild laments the rise of an era in which the previously ‚private‛ 
negotiation of emotion has come to be replaced by corporate standards and scripts, 
what she points towards arguably involves considerably more complex and longer-
term processes than the shift in practices adopted by capitalist enterprises.52  Indeed, 
the loss of the authentic emotional self, and the Homo clausus self-experience to 
which it relates, have emerged as enduring themes in Western thought since the Re-
naissance.53  Moreover, the management and production of emotion has never been 
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exclusively ‚private‛ in the sense that Hochschild employs this term.54  In fact, as 
Wouters observes, we could posit a counter-trend in the longer term to that which 
Hochschild observes, one in which models of emotional exchange have become less 
rigid and more differentiated: a controlled de-controlling of emotional controls.55  
 
Elias’s argument is that as processes of civilisation have developed, so social 
demands for affect management have become increasingly ‚second nature,‛ ‚inter-
nalised.‛  In relation to this, explicit social rules and sanctions on behaviour have 
come to lose significance, and there has emerged a seemingly more relaxed, playful, 
and informal approach to codes of etiquette and emotional conduct.  In short, there 
has been a shift in the character of social constraints towards self-restraint whereby 
social demands for affect-management have come to move away from the forma-
lised treatises of etiquette manuals, manners texts, and defined emotional scripts to 
take on a different form — a move towards ‚informal‛ and often more implicit 
standards of socially sanctioned emotional behaviour.  The theme in Elias’s work, 
while elucidated in his original The Civilising Process (2000) [first published 1938 as 
Über den Prozess der Zivilisation], and centrally explored in his later works, notably 
The Court Society (2006) [1969],56 and, together with Eric Dunning, Quest for 
Excitement (2009) [1986], has been given further articulation and development by Cas 
Wouters, who refers to the process as ‚informalisation.‛57  Such processes are most 
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clearly manifested in the rise of the ‚permissive society‛ and ‚expressive revolu-
tion.‛58  In processes of informalisation ‚<dominant modes of conduct symbolizing 
institutionalized power relationships, came to be more and more ignored and 
attacked, leading to growing negotiability and leniency in the ways people oppose 
and cooperate with each other.‛59  Within the workplace, informalisation can be seen 
in the move towards ‚flatter‛ organisational structures; decentralisation of decision 
making; the growing complexity and ‚flexibility‛ of work roles; the dissipation of 
organisational boundaries; and the less formal relations between superiors and 
subordinates.60  Processes of informalisation relate to ‚<the use of first names and 
colloquial speech< confessing private feelings and expressing emotions, engaging 
in intimate relations on the work floor, and in general the blurring of the boundaries 
between ‚work life‛ and ‚private life.‛61  But this apparent ‚relaxing‛ of controls, 
this opening of emotional exchange to greater variety, individual nuance, and the 
growth of emotional alternatives, also involves at one level an intensification of 
demands on affect economy central to processes of civilisation.62  In the relative ab-
sence of explicit and formal rules governing behaviour we are compelled to develop 
more reflexive means of self-regulation in order to negotiate loosely-defined, ever-
changing networks of social relationships characteristic of more flexible organi-
sations.63  
 
An example to help clarify processes of informalisation, both as a feature of these 
processes, and as model for informalisation more generally, is that of the increasing 
popularity of ‚mufti‛ days within large corporations in Great Britain and the United  
States.  These are days, usually once per week, when employees can ostensibly dress 
as they wish, they do not need to wear the corporate uniform, or dress in line with 
formal company policy.  There are, of course, considerable variations in mufti days. 
Some organisations may specify, very loosely, that even on these days, employees 
must be smart-casual.  Others may have no explicitly stated specifications at all. 
However, rather than their constituting a simple relaxation of pressures on how to 
dress, we are immediately presented with another set of demands, and these might 
be even more intensely felt that those arising from company dress code.  We must 
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still dress appropriately.  But what is ‚appropriate‛?  We are compelled to ask a 
series of questions of our clothes: ‚is this fashionable?‛ ‚Is this the right label?‛ (and 
this refers as much to labels on the inside of our clothes as it does to those embla-
zoned on the outside).  The questions are expressive of more than just commercial 
concerns.  ‚Is this too tarty?‛  ‚Does my butt look big in this?‛  ‚Is this too nerdy?‛ 
‚Is this too formal?‛  ‚Too casual?‛  ‚Too stiff?‛  ‚Too power-dressy?‛  ‚Too loud?‛ 
‚Too dull?‛  ‚Is this really me?‛  We are compelled to dress ‚correctly,‛ not so much 
according to the formally defined ‚external‛ standard of the corporation, but now 
according to a blend and balance of unstated ‚internalised‛ and explicit ‚external‛ 
standards and concerns.  We must express both our individuality and our sense of 
belonging through our particular way of dressing.  On the face of it, we are free to 
wear tracksuits to work, but would we be ‚comfortable?‛  And what might ‚they‛ 
think of ‚me‛ if I did?  Likewise, what would ‚we‛ think of those who did? 
 
By similar extension, the concept of informalisation is also useful in understanding 
the rise of EI.  As I have argued, rather than constituting a proliferation of simple 
emotional scripts — of ‚emotional uniforms‛ — EI asks us to develop our emotion 
management ‚skills‛ or ‚competencies‛ such that we are emotionally adept: we are 
comfortable, we are angry at the right times, with the right people, and so forth.  We 
are asked to develop a playful, flexible approach to expressing and managing emo-
tions.64  It is precisely these central features of EI — demands for more playful flexi-
bility, and, in relation to this, the growing awareness of using emotions and the 
management of emotions for competitive advantage — that are defining features of 
processes of informalisation. 
 
Viewed within the context of informalisation, it is also perhaps easier to make sense 
of the seemingly contradictory aspects of the discourse of EI: it promotes an emanci-
pation of emotions from explicit ‚external‛ standards, while simultaneously consti-
tuting an elaboration of such standards under the guise of competencies not scripts; 
it presents demands for emotional honesty and authenticity while simultaneously 
rendering emotions as projects to be developed and managed; it involves calls for a 
liberation of emotions from formalised controls whilst simultaneously leaving its 
subjects to negotiate informal and implicit behavioural and emotional standards as 
expressions of themselves.  EI thus calls not for a scripting of emotion, as posited by 
the concept of emotional labour, but instead a reflexive negotiation of our emotional 
lives at work and beyond.  This emotional reflexivity involves both a relaxation and an 
intensification of emotional controls: we might well ‚screw the rules,‛ but we must 
do so in a manner that stays true to ourselves — in ways that are appropriate and 
intelligent.  
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From Repression to Stimulation: EI as Governmentality 
The observation of these ambivalent and seemingly paradoxical aspects of processes 
of informalisation presents a source of potential common ground between the work 
of Elias and Foucault.  In an interview with the editorial collective of Quel Corps? 
Foucault observes that with relations of power, one is always ‚<faced with complex 
phenomena which don’t obey the Hegelian form of the dialectic.‛65  Foucault pro-
vides the example of bodily regimens such as exercise, diet, body-building and so 
forth which, he proposes, first serve to produce the effects of power — the ‚healthy‛ 
bodies of children, soldiers, etc. — but then are used against power: ‚Suddenly, what 
had made power strong becomes used to attack it.‛66  But power, he proposes, inva-
riably retreats, reorganises, re-invests itself in new forms, new modalities.  Power, 
thus, is characterised by a continual and recursive struggle involving moves and ad-
versarial counter-moves.  However, such struggles occur not in the manner of 
salvoes from opposite ends of a battlefield, but within the same sites and relays.  
 
To clarify, Foucault’s more specific example is that of auto-eroticism and the revolt 
against this in eighteenth-century Europe.  In this context, masturbation came to be 
viewed as a sickness, and a system of monitoring and control was instituted, in 
particular over the bodies of children.  Foucault writes, ‚But sexuality, through thus 
becoming an object of analysis and concern, surveillance and control, engenders as 
the same time an intensification of each individual’s desire for, in, an over his 
body.‛67  The sexual revolt against such repression can be seen as the counterpoint to 
this incursion.  The response from power is not to ‚quell the rebellion,‛ but rather to 
embrace it through an economic and ideological exploitation of eroticism and sexual 
‚liberation,‛ from sun-screen to pornographic films.68  As such, Foucault argues, 
‚<we find a new mode of investment which presents itself no longer in the form of 
control by repression but that of control by stimulation.  ‘Get undressed — but be 
slim, good-looking, tanned.‛’69  
 
In the case of EI, the ‚repression‛ of the emotional uniform is replaced by the 
‚stimulation‛ of emotional mufti.  Emotional expression replaces feeling rules and 
scripts.  But the intelligent management of feeling remains a lifelong project, one 
involving the continual and uncertain negotiation of how and when it is right to be 
angry, happy, enthusiastic, indifferent, and so forth: one to be undertaken against 
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the transient, shifting and indefinite standard of what is appropriate in the ebb and 
flow of life within and beyond the workplace.  In this manner, the emancipation 
from the emotional uniform and the resistance of emotional scripts that is offered by 
EI is simultaneously a new form of governmentality: resistance becomes discipline, 
and equally, as I have argued elsewhere, this self-same discipline offers oppor-
tunities for resistance — perhaps in the very name of emotional honesty and 
authenticity that has been solicited.70  The case of EI, then, would appear to exem-
plify Foucault’s arguments that power is exercised as much through what is per-
mitted as what is forbidden, through both collusion and opposition; indeed, it 
consists in the generation of such fields of discursive possibility.  As Foucault, here 
citing Servan, argues: ‚A stupid despot may constrain his slaves with iron chains; 
but a true politician binds them even more with the chain of their own ideas [which 
is] all the stronger if we do not know of what it is made and we believe it to be our 
own work.‛71  
 
To employ a Foucauldian distinction, while emotional labour might best be under-
stood as a technology of domination, EI appears to constitute a technology of the self.72 
Where technologies of domination are deployed to ‚<determine the conduct of 
individuals and submit them to certain ends or domination;‛73 technologies of the 
self involve new techniques of self-revelation, new ways of knowing oneself, and a 
proliferation of new forms of expertise: techniques that ‚<permit individuals to 
effect, by their own means, or with the help of others, a certain number of operations 
on their own bodies and souls, thoughts, conduct, and way of being, so as to 
transform themselves in order to attain a certain state of happiness, purity, wisdom, 
perfection or immortality.‛74  
 
These technologies, Foucault argues, are historically variant but have centrally in-
volved changing conceptions of care of the self, knowledge of the self, truth-telling, and 
self-disclosure.75  The guiding practice that characterises such processes of self-forma-
                                                 
70 See Hughes. 
71 M. Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison (London: Penguin, 1982), 102-103. 
72 M. Foucault, ‚Technologies of the Self,‛ in L. Martin, H. Gutman & P. Hutton (eds.), 
Technologies of the Self: A Seminar with Michel Foucault (London: Tavistock, 1988), 18. 
73 Ibid. 
74 Ibid. 
75 It is my express intention not to conflate ‚technologies of the self‛ with ‚care of the self.‛ 
Particularly in his later work, Foucault presented ‚care of the self‛ as an ethical position developed 
in classical philosophy that he employed to make sense of a range of practices and technologies of 
modern selfhood. ‚Care of oneself‛ escaped its first philosophical meanings before gradually 
becoming more general in scope, acquiring ‚<the dimensions and forms of a veritable ‚culti-
vation of the self‛‛ that ‚<became instilled in ways of living< procedures, practices, and 
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tion — one which stands at the juncture between technologies of domination and 
technologies of the self — is the confessional.  Confessional narratives range from 
Christian confession to autobiography, and (most significantly in the context of the 
present discussion) different forms of therapy.  Confession involves a particular set of 
discursive practices in which the self’s ‚self-relation‛ is constituted — whereby 
subjects are effectively both ‚producers‛ and ‚produced.‛  The production of con-
fessional narratives draws centrally upon the techniques of self-knowledge, truth-
telling, revelation, exposure, in which the self is rendered visible and made ame-
nable to change, and ultimately transformation — motifs that are once again 
repackaged under such guises as knowing and managing one’s emotions, and managing 
and motivating oneself, and the more general quest to find one’s true self that is 
enshrined in Goleman’s model of EI.  Like other similar therapeutic discourses, a 
particularly attractive aspect of EI its capacity to offer a potential resolution to the 
seemingly irreconcilable ideals associated with different arenas of social life, such as 
those which relate to the striving for corporate success, on the one hand, and 
personal fulfilment on the other; or, in a similar manner, the seemingly incompatible 
goals of interpersonal dynamism and emotional authenticity.76  In other words, such 
notions offer a means to reconcile our ‚private‛ and ‚public‛ emotional lives. 
 
For Foucault, technologies of the self are perpetuated by expertise claims, which, in 
the current era, are typically drawn from scientific or scientistic discourse.  In the 
case of EI, as mentioned above, developments in neuroscience are often cited as of 
central importance. In a section of his Emotional Intelligence: why it can matter more 
than IQ entitled ‚Why this exploration now?‛ Goleman accounts for the genesis of 
his work on EI as residing in recent ‚bursts‛ of scientific studies on emotion and 
brain functioning. He writes:  
 
Most dramatic are the glimpses of the brain at work, made possible by 
innovative methods such as new brain-imaging technologies.  They have made 
visible for the first time in human history what has always been a source of deep 
mystery: exactly how this intricate mass of cells operates while we think and feel, 
imagine and dream.  The flood of neuro-biological data lets us understand more 
clearly than ever how the brain’s centers for emotion move us to rage or to tears, 
and how more ancient parts of the brain, which stir us to make war as well as 
love, are channelled for better or worse.  This unprecedented clarity on the wor-
kings of emotions and their failings brings into focus some fresh remedies for our 
collective emotional crisis.77  
                                                                                                                                                 
formulas that people reflected on, developed, perfected, and taught.‛ See M. Foucault, The Care of 
the Self: The History of Sexuality Volume 3 (London: Penguin, 1986), 44-45. 
76 M. McDonald & J. O’Callaghan, ‚Positive psychology: a Foucauldian critique,‛ The Humanistic 
Psychologist, 36: (2008), 4.  
77 Goleman, Emotional Intelligence: why it can matter more than IQ, xi. 
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The re-ordering of the limits of the visible and invisible, the development of new 
diagnostic techniques, the extension of the clinical gaze and associated new modes 
of surveillance (here via functional neuro-imaging) are all redolent of central themes 
explored by Foucault in The Birth of The Clinic, which I can only deal with briefly 
here.  Nonetheless, we can observe that EI also involves a discursive corollary of 
these diagnostic techniques — to make the emotional self visible — in various aspects of 
its institutional–therapeutic practice.  A key example is provided in the passage 
below where Goleman describes the process by which, through building on the com-
petency of emotional self awareness, consultants working within the Lincoln motor 
company instituted a programme of ‚unlearning defensive habits of conversation:‛78  
 
The method is simple: Instead of arguing, the parties agree to mutually explore 
the assumptions that undergird their points of view.  A classic example of how 
people jump to conclusions is when you see someone yawn in a meeting, leap to 
the assumption that he is bored, and then skip to the more damaging over-
generalization that he doesn’t care about the meeting, anyone else’s thoughts, or 
the entire project<  Once these hidden assumptions surface, they can be tested 
against reality by talking about them.  For instance, we may discover the yawn 
was not from boredom but rather exhaustion due to getting up in the night with 
a cranky infant.79  
 
The practices described above would appear to embody a collective variant of the 
technology of self-writing, self-decipherment, and autopoiesis: Foucault’s herme-
neutic of the self.  The technique involves a reworked confessional.  We are asked to 
contrast what we show to the world, what we express, with what we actually feel, as 
a means of accessing the hidden emotional truth, both about ourselves, and about 
our relations with others.  We must expose our emotional selves to the gaze of 
expertise, to be corrected, reconciled, normalised.  Here we can be truly, genuinely, 
honest — but not without bounds.  ‚If I tell the truth, what will that say about me?‛ 
‚What might be the implications?‛  ‚How secure is my job?’  ‚Will I be deemed to be 
emotionally stupid?‛  In this way, dissent is openly permitted, it is in fact solicited, 
but simultaneously, it is subsumed within the conditions that make it possible. 
Ultimately, it is stylistically transformed into source of ‚group emotional conflict‛ 
and ‚interpersonal incompatibility‛: a project that needs further work, both by ‚us‛ 
and by ‚you‛ (but not without ‚our‛ help).  Both managers and employees are 
positioned simultaneously as subjects and objects, all face the scrutiny of all, and 
while an employee’s lack of commitment and self-motivation might be exposed for 
correction, so might a manager’s lack of empathy or emotional honesty.  All, at least 
                                                 
78 Goleman, Working With Emotional Intelligence, 292. 
79 Ibid., 292-293. 
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potentially, is resolvable, but an EI consultant’s first step is to scan the emotional 
landscape, to elucidate the cracks, tensions, fault lines, and ultimately seek to correct 
these. 
 
Foucault and Elias: Critical Differences 
While, for the purposes of the analysis presented above, I have focused on the 
common ground of Foucault and Elias, principally to develop some of my key 
arguments about EI, it is also important to acknowledge the considerable incompa-
tibilities and tensions which separate the work of these authors.  It is thus worth 
briefly considering a few significant points of departure and disagreement. 
 
As the above comparison of the authors in relation to the case of EI serves to demon-
strate, a key difference between Elias and Foucault resides in the way these authors 
discuss power.  From an Eliasian ‚figurational‛ standpoint, Foucault’s language has 
the tendency to reify power as an ‚agent‛ which variously ‚invests itself,‛ ‚retreats 
and re-organises,‛ and otherwise presents a ‚side‛ to be ‚resisted.‛80  In his earlier 
cited Quel Corps? interview on the topic, he appears to use the word ‚power‛ to refer 
to a ‚thing-like‛ entity which can be ‚attacked,‛ ‚made strong,‛ or used ‚against‛ 
‚itself.‛  For Elias, terms like ‚resistance‛ and ‚discipline‛ refer to aspects of power, 
not ‚its‛ opposites.  Furthermore, Elias’s focus is invariably upon power relations: 
power balances, ratios, asymmetries, etc.  Elias was fastidiously concerned with the 
precision and clarity of his concepts and language — opting always for formulations 
that facilitated an engagement with processes and relationships.  And yet, despite 
these differences in formulation, Foucault’s more general understanding of power is 
ultimately also a relational one: that power is not monolithic, cannot be equated with 
notions such as ‚authority,‛ or ‚the state‛ — that it is multiple, diffuse, and without 
essence. 
 
Part of this issue relates to important differences in the intellectual lineages of Elias 
and Foucault.  Elias’s work can be seen to have arisen out of a sociological tradition 
which stretches back to the work of authors such as Comte, one in which sociology is 
held to be an entirely separate discipline from philosophy, and in which philoso-
phical concepts, language, and modes of theorising are consciously rejected.  The 
work of Foucault, by contrast, can be located within a primarily philosophical, 
‚epistemological break‛ tradition exemplified by writers like Gaston Bachelard and 
his pupil, Georges Canguilhem — both of whom wrote in direct response to Comte 
and the tradition his work exemplified.  Indeed, partly in relation to these differ-
ences in intellectual lineage, there are marked contrasts between Foucault and Elias 
                                                 
80 See Foucault, Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972–1977; see also 
Kilminster’s critique in The Sociological Revolution: From Enlightenment to the Global Age. 
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with regard to their respective sensitivity to historical continuity and discontinuity. 
And, again in relation to this heritage, Foucault was considerably more concerned 
with the power effects of knowledge than was Elias.  Just as Elias might take issue 
with certain philosophical residues in Foucault’s language and theorising, so might 
Foucault object to the scientific lexicon adopted by Elias.  From a Foucauldian per-
spective, Elias’s writing takes on all the rhetorical force of a science — its tight, 
precise, detached formulations at times seem to betray an underpinning Freudia-
nism.  Indeed, while Elias might have challenged Foucault to place the discourse of 
philosophy itself on the analytical operating table, Foucault might well have asked 
Elias to undertake a sociogenesis of the Freudian repressive hypothesis that is 
consistently used as a touchstone for Elias’s work, and to consider the power effects 
of this notion in the constitution of the fabled modern subject.  
 
Given these substantial differences, then, it is perhaps all the more remarkable that 
we find some notable agreement between these authors on such matters as shifting 
formations of selfhood, including the ascendancy of particular forms of self-
relationship under specific figurational/discursive conditions; long-term shifts in 
behavioural standards, particularly those which pertain to sexual/bodily func-
tioning; and indeed — as have been centrally explored in this paper — social transi-
tions in the management, display, and articulation of emotions both in ‚public‛ and 
‚private‛ life, including the historical emergence, and subsequently increasing 
dissolution and collapse, of the private/public distinction itself. 
 
Conclusion 
Taken together then, the analytical possibilities presented by the work of Elias and 
Foucault offer potentially complementary insights into EI and the changing 
emotional rules for work.  When viewed through the lens of existing sociological 
accounts of emotion at work, EI has all the appearances of a set of managerial scripts 
(packaged as competencies) for workers’ emotional behaviour that can be under-
stood to constitute demands for emotional labour.  However, it has been argued, a 
key component of such ‚scripts‛ themselves is that of the need for emotional 
honesty at the right times, which in and of itself involves a rejection of simple 
emotional scripting.  Advocates of EI ask us to go beyond ‚deep acting,‛ they ask us 
not to be acting at all.  But rather than this constituting a sudden call for an 
emancipation of emotional controls, the free play of emotions in the workplace, 
advocates of EI demand instead a more individually-nuanced navigation of feelings: 
a reflexive emotional self that increasingly has to take account of a far more complex 
array of considerations.  The ideas relating to EI may well involve a call for us to 
scrap the emotional uniform, but in its place we must implicitly know how to 
manage and ‚dress‛ our affects in a manner that is appropriate to any given context, 
and which simultaneously sits comfortably with the real me.  Such tendencies serve to 
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demonstrate the ambivalent character of power and control, both within the work-
place and beyond whereby relations of power can be understood to consist as much 
in what is permitted as what is proscribed. 
 
The seemingly contradictory aspects of EI have been considered via both an Eliasian 
and a Foucauldian analytic.  They have been used empirically to highlight some of 
the key complementarities between Elias’s ideas about the shifting character of the 
social restraint towards self-restraint — particularly the move towards informalisa-
tion — and Foucault’s arguments about governmentality and power/knowledge. 
However, it has been argued, such analytical complementarities are set against con-
siderable incompatibilities in the work of the two authors.  Principal among these 
are the philosophical underpinnings of the work of Foucault and the explicit ‚social 
scientific‛ grounding of Elias’s approach.  I have proposed that such differences are 
manifest in the very language and concepts of either author — in, for example, 
Foucault’s treatment of power and Elias’s orientation towards scientific knowledge. 
Such differences in lexicon and lineage present considerable obstacles to those who 
wish to compare the work of Elias and Foucault.81  Nonetheless, in the spirit of 
openness of this Special Edition, it is very much hoped that such obstacles are not 
insurmountable, and that subsequent comparisons will yield further dialogue, cross-
fertilization and, perhaps, synthesis, of the research and theorisation of scholars 
from the Foucauldian and figurational communities.  
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